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Abstract – This paper explores the consequences of 
ignoring pre-existing un-official and illegal networks 
for external interventions with approaches to sustain-
able management of natural resources in marginal-
ized areas of the developing world. To do so, it as-
sesses the effects of a public Research & Develop-
ment (R&D) intervention aimed at promoting sustain-
able exploitation and trade of aloe-based products in 
the semi-arid Baringo County (Kenya), and how it 
interacted with an existing illegal supply chain dedi-
cated to the exploitation of indigenous aloe species. 
Data were collected through a qualitative and partici-
patory assessment that was conducted between April 
and November 2012, using an analytical framework 
and guidelines derived from the innovation system 
perspective. The study shows that geographical dis-
parities in the effect of external intervention are the 
result of unplanned interactions between project 
stakeholders and actors from the illegal supply chain. 
The Baringo aloe case suggests that networks in-
volved in illegal trade of natural resources should not 
be ignored or sidelined by R&D interventions but 
should on the contrary be supported to allow them to 
evolve towards certified trade.1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In developing countries, inclusive approaches to 
improve access to natural resources are perceived as 
a way for public action to break the ‘downward spi-
ral’ of rural poverty and environmental degradation 
(Scherr, 2000). But livelihood strategies sometimes 
rely on illegal exploitation and trade of natural re-
source through non-official supply chains. Such 
configurations often lead to environmental threat 
that governments fail to mitigate (Ascher, 1999). 
Therefore a challenge for public action is to jointly 
address poverty and environment degradation by 
intervening at the supply chain level. 
 
This paper explores the hypothesis that chances of 
success of public interventions with approaches to 
sustainable management of natural resources in-
crease when external interventions build on pre-
existing illegal supply chains. We illustrate this idea 
by reporting how official and non-official stakeholder 
networks have been interacting with each other in 
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Baringo (Kenya), within a six years period. During 
that time, a public Research & Development (R&D) 
intervention actively promoted sustainable produc-
tion and export of aloe-based products as an alter-
native to illegal Wild Aloe Exploitation (WAE). Trade 
of all aloe species (except for Aloe vera) is regulated 
by the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). 
 
METHODS 
A qualitative and participatory assessment was con-
ducted in Baringo between April and November 
2012, with the purpose of analyzing the multi-
stakeholder process in which aloe cultivation and 
certified trade were introduced as 2 innovations to 
replace illegal WAE. We used an analytical frame-
work and guidelines derived from the Innovation 
System (IS) theoretical framework (Lundvall, 1992). 
The framework paid particular attention to how this 
innovation process unfolded over a 30 year period, 
and focused among others on stakeholders and their 
roles, the types of innovations developed, the trig-
gers and drivers, the role of markets and projects. 
This study was conducted in the framework of the 
JOLISAA project (Triomphe et al. 2013), by a team 
comprising of researchers, students, and community 
representatives. Data were collected through indi-
vidual interviews, group discussions, workshops as 
well as from published and unpublished documents.  
 
RESULTS 
Baringo County lies in the Rift Valley Province of 
Kenya. South-North geographical disparities lead to 
differences among farmers in terms of poverty, 
market access, and livelihood systems. WAE has 
been occurring without control from the 1980s in the 
drought-prone and poverty-stricken pastoral areas 
of northern Baringo. Demand for aloe sap created by 
traders supplying the growing international market 
for aloe sap derivates triggered WAE in the early 
1980s. Traders put in place logistical arrangement 
(decentralized processing units, storage facilities, 
transportation), and set up networks of aloe sap 
buyers/processors spread across the territory. They 
also played the role of knowledge brokers by devel-
oping a series of innovations in aloe harvesting and 
trade and by training local farmers on harvesting 
methods, sap quality tests and sap processing. In 
doing so, traders became the central node of a vi-
brant supply chain linking northern Baringo house-
holds to the global market (Fig.1). In northern 
Baringo, the illegal aloe value chain offered margin-
alized stakeholders a fragile livelihood source, as 
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traders offered low sap buying prices. But in their 
dire context aloe represented a diversification option 
and a drought aversion strategy well fitted with the 
social organization of pastoral households.  
 
In 1986, uncontrolled commercial harvest was ac-
cused of destroying aloe populations and WAE was 
declared illegal through a presidential decree. Since 
this decree was not translated into law, nothing 
hampered the illegal supply chain with the exception 
of occasional custom seizures. In 2004, growing 
attention on the issues raised by unchecked WAE 
prompted the Kenyan government to try and estab-
lish a legal and administrative framework to enable 
the country to export aloe derivates in accordance 
with CITES, with Baringo selected as a pilot area for 
aloe certified exploitation and trade.  
 
From 2004 to 2009, public R&D interventions took 
place in Baringo to promote aloe cultivation and to 
build up a certified, sustainable aloe supply chain 
(Fig. 1). Most activities focused on the more acces-
sible agro pastoral areas of southern Baringo, an 
area in which WAE had never occurred. In contrast 
to Northern Baringo, opportunity cost of harvesting 
aloe was higher because smallholders benefited from 
a relative diversity of livelihood sources and good 
market access. Smallholders received trainings and 
aloe seedlings, a sap-processing factory was built in 
partnership between a private trader and the com-
munities, a farmer organization was empowered and 
Aloe Management Units (AMUs) were established. 
AMUs were delineated areas from where registered 
smallholders harvested and sold aloe sap to certified 
collection points following production rules and quo-
tas. Despite this flurry of interventions, several chal-
lenges reinforced each other and contributed to the 
quick paralysis of the newly-emerging certified sup-
ply chain: low interest by southern Baringo farmers 
in aloe cultivation and sap selling, conflicts between 
project partners leading to market uncertainties and 
to limited development of certified trade.   
 
Meanwhile, in northern Baringo unintended interac-
tions between official and non-official networks had 
positive consequences, despite limited external in-
terventions. Aloe cultivation met with a favorable 
interest from local farmers, and smallholders started 
supplying AMUs collection points before certified 
trade stagnated. Farmers perceived aloe cultivation 
as a strategy for reducing the risks linked to a fragile 
dependency on spontaneous aloe. Moreover, uncer-
tainties in certified commercial outlet were reduced 
by relying on - or reverting to - the historically much 
more stable and effective non-official supply chain. 
Lastly, adoption of aloe cultivation was made easy 
by the anchorage of aloe-related activities in pasto-
ral households’ social organization, as well as by the 
knowledge accumulated on aloe harvest. On the 
negative side, the official/non-official networks in-
teraction also led to price competition between the 
legal and illegal channels. This encouraged small-
holders to harvest more spontaneous aloe than 




Figure 1. Interactions among illegal and public networks for 
aloe exploitation and trade. 
 
DISCUSSION 
In northern Baringo, temporary success of public 
interventions was the consequence of unplanned 
hybridization between official and non-official supply 
chain. On the other hand, by ignoring prior existing 
practices and networks, projects were confronted by 
a double challenge: low interest from smallholders in 
the south, and competition with illegal supply chain 
leading to accelerated natural resource depletion in 
the north. The Baringo aloe case suggests that wild 
harvesters and illegal value chains’ stakeholders are 
fully part of natural resource management systems, 
and that intervening agencies should explore ways 
of recognizing and incorporating their experience to 
allow them to evolve towards certified trade (in this 
view, innovation system theory provides relevant 
analytical framework). Doing so appears to have a 
greater potential to achieve sustainable manage-
ment of natural resources and poverty reduction.  
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